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The Next ODR: Imwovina the Linkaae Between Ends, Wavs, and Means
In May 1997, DOD reported the results of its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the third major post-cold war review of defense strategy and force requirements since the Warsaw Pact's dissolution. The QDR adopted a threepronged defense strategy built around shaping the strategic environment during peacetrme through day-today military contacts; responding to a full spectrum of military operations; and preparing for an uncertain future by investing now In new technologies and force modernization. Senior DOD leaders reasoned that only modest cuts should be made rn force structure and personnel given the strategy's continuing emphasis on maintaining the capability to conduct two overlapping major regional conflicts. DOD also concluded that it could effectively implement the strategy within an expected no-growth budget environment of $250 billion annually. DOD assumed that much of the additional spending required for modernization would flow from a vanety of planned initiatives to trim DOD's infrastructure such as new base closures and outsourcing functions tradltronally performed by DOD's military and civilian workforce.
Nearly two years have passed since DOD's senior leaders announced the QDR results and began the challenging task of implementing its recommendauons.
During this time, DOD has realized significant problems in SuCCeSsfUlly implementing its strategy despite having characterized the QDR as an effective, Clinton's decrsron to allocate an additional $112 billion to defense during this bme period. However, close scrutiny of the plan reveals it IS far from a panacea for DOD's budget woes. Overall, the administration's plan fails to recbfy a counterproductive but long-held pracbce of sacrificing longer-term funding requirements to meet near-term needs. Much of the planned increase will go to fund pay raises and benefits rather than shifting funds to modemizabon--a long- Committee's report notes, however, that failing to provide the full funding needed to finish mWary construchon projects "provides no savings at all over time".5 Its effect is merely to exacerbate the difficult trade-offs that will need to be made rn future years.
In addition, it IS unlikely that the need for difficult tradeoffs can be avoided through future defense spending increases. Although some future increases in defense spending may occur, it is unlikely that they will be sufficient to fund the broad array of weapons and equipment the services seek to replace. Moreover, proposals to increase defense spending may not fare well in the future as execubve branch and congressional decisionmakers struggle to resolve Medicare and Social Security funding problems affecbng the aging baby boomer generabon.
Lessons Learned and Kev Inaredients for an Effective ODR
While conducting another QDR has merits from a conceptual standpoint, its real usefulness will depend on how it is carned out. It is within this realm that valuable lessons can be drawn from the 1997 QDR. Moreover, now is the bme for DOD and Congressional decision makers to focus their attenbon on these lessons and evaluate proposals for crafting an alternative process that is more likely to enhance the QDR's results. Overall, DOD and the Congress will need to rethink several issues including (1) the scope of the review; (2) guidance from senior leaders, particularly with regard to the types of alternabves to be considered; (3) extent of participation in the process; (4) One of the 1997 QDR's most significant shortcomings was its failure to examine force structure and modernization alternabves that may represent suitable means of implementing the defense strategy but that challenge existing norms.
For example, DOD's computer wargaming of force structure alternabves to conduct two overlapping major theater wars only examined the feasibility of making 10, 20,Bnd 30 percent across-the-hoard cuts to the services' current force structure. This type of "salami slrce" approach was used largely hecause OSD officials believed they would have been unable to obtain the services' consensus to model drsproportionate cuts. In addition, DOD's modeling of a nobonal conflict against a regional great power in 2014 did not examine a wide enough range of alternatives to DOD's current modemizabon plans or consider the potential for changes in doctnne and organization. Given the potential for adversaries to adopt asymmetric strategies that exploit U.S. vulnerablllbes and take advantage of the rapid blurring of military and commercial technologies, confining DOD's analysis of modernization requirements to extrapolabons of the current force structure may leave the United States unprepared to respond effectively to future threats.
On a positive note, DOD spent more effort examining requirements for peace operations during the QDR than it had In pnor strategy reviews. Specifically, DOD conducted a war game series known as Dynamic Commitment which examined DOD's ability to carry out a randomly-generated mix of operations including non-combatant evacuations, peace operations, and major theater wars.
However, although this assessment showed that certain types of DOD forces and assets are currently in short supply and are likely to remain so in the future, DOD did not examine the costs and benefits of buying more of these capabilities while decreasing other capabilities in less demand.
Developing an effective plan to balance near-term and long-term risks will occur only if DOD's senior leaders establish clear expectations that they expect the QDR to challenge existing norms and evaluate alternatives that break "nce bowls." Conversely, failure to move beyond the "salamr slice" approach will only seT\ce to undermine the QDR's value and credrbility. During the next QDR, the Secretary of Defense should be bnefed on the types of force structure and modernization alternatives DOD plans to evaluate before OSD and joint staff officials conduct detailed assessments and computer-ass&d wargamrng.
Moreover, the altemabves modeled should reflect a range of approaches tailored during the opening phases of a conflict should also be examined. Given the large number of force structure alternatives that could be developed, senior DOD leaders will need to play a crrtrcal role in narrowing the range of opbons to those that seem most worthwhile and feasible.
Structure and Extemt of Partickation
In planning the next QDR effort, DOD's leaders also will need to develop a structure for the review and determine the extent of particrpabon In the process.
In 1997 
Timina of the ODR and Interface with External Grouts
The bming of the next QDR is another issue that must he assessed, since timing could significantly affect the review's long-term impact. Neither DOD nor
Congress has specified exactly when the next QDR will hegrn or he completed.
However, many people assume that it will hegin shortly after the next elecbon In 
Budget Assumptions and Alternative Budaet Scenarios
The QDR's value also would be enhanced if DOD introduced greater realism and discipline In estimating the future costs of funding DOD's forces, infrastructure, and new weapon systems. Realistic cost esbmates are needed to ensure that senior decsron-makers fully understand the risks associated with various force structure and modernization alternatives being considered and can adequately weigh their costs and benefits. Conversely, optimistic budget estimates can lead senior leaders to avoid making tough decisions. DOD made an attempt during the 1997 QDR to confront and rectify long-standing budget practices that led it to systematically underestimate certain lypes of costs. However, some QDR budget assumptions have proven to be unrealistic despite these efforts, thus contributing to the current mismatch between ends, ways, and means. In analyzing force structure and modernization alternatives during the next QDR, DOD must build upon its 1997 effort to instill budget discipline and further improve the realism of its budget assumptions and cost estimates. In addition, it may want to examine a broader range of assumptions regarding top-line defense spending.
In its May 1997 QDR report, DOD acknowledged that it had been unable to achieve its goal of increasing procurement funding to about $60 billion per year, the amount its believes IS necessary to recapitalize the force and exploit a potential revolution in military technology, because funds have been repeatedly redirected to meet near-term operations and maintenance costs that were underbudgeted.* This redirection threatens DOD's ability to adequately fund the "prepare" part of its strategy because it has created a significant backlog of modernization requirements that will come due in the early part of the next decade as DOD's aging inventory of aircraft, ships, and ground equipment become too old to operate and too costly to sustain. 
Conclusion
During the two years since DOD completed its QDR, it has become clear that the United States IS strll in the process of ad@XIg to the post-Cold war security envrronment and continues to lack a strategy that balances clear natronal mMary
ObJectives with an appropriate mix of forces and weapons and that can be sustained within expected funding levels. The QDR can play a significant role in this process and should be continued. DOD and Congress have a window of opportunity within the next year or so to improve the process. In assessing how to revise the process, DOD and Congress should place highest priority on identrfying ways to streamline it to focus senior leaders' attention on the most critical issues and identify ways to ensure that participants in the process focus on meaningful force structure and modernization alternatives. In addition, DOD must work harder to instill rigor in the budget estimates underpinning the QDR.
In the interim, DOD officials also should be focusing on identifying the types of scenanos that are likely to challenge DOD forces in the future and improving the models and other analytical tools used to evaluate how alternative mixes of U.S.
forces are likely to respond to such threats. Such planning will go a long way to providing a new administration with the analytical capability it will need to develop a coherent military strategy relevant to the future.
